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On the monotonic core
Abstract: The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable
utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Alloca-
tion Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the
core of a certain game associated to the initial game.
Resum: El monotonic core d’un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible
(T.U.-game) és el conjunt format per totes les seves Population Monotonic
Allocation Schemes. En aquest treball provem que aquest conjunt coincideix
sempre amb el core de cert joc associat al joc inicial.
1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility (a game) assigns to each coalition
of players a real number representing the worth of the coalition, that is, what
it can achieve on its own.
Sprumont (1990) introduces the concept of Population Monotonic Alloca-
tion Scheme (PMAS) in cooperative games. A PMAS selects a core allocation
for every subgame of a game in such a way that the payo¤ of any player
cannot decrease as the coalition to which he belongs enlarges. As a conse-
quence, a game with a PMAS has a nonempty core. Sprumont shows that
all convex games have a PMAS (for example, the extended Shapley value).
Therefore, PMAS can be proposed for many well-known models, for instance
bankruptcy problems (see Grahn and Voorneveld, 2002). Moulin (1990) also
applies PMAS to the problem of cost-sharing of public goods. Moreover, he
gives a theoretical characterization of the class of games with a PMAS.
Norde and Reijnierse (2002) give some conditions (in …nite number) to
determine whether a game has a PMAS or not. In the case of a four-player
game there are sixty inequalities that its characteristic function must satisfy
in order to have a PMAS.
Moulin (1990) de…nes the concept of the monotonic core of a game as the
set formed by all its PMAS. The monotonic core of a game has topological
and algebraic properties similar to those of the core, since both sets are convex
and compact polyhedrons in their respective Euclidean spaces.
The aim of this paper is to show that the monotonic core of a game is
the core of another game. To this end, we consider the model of games with
restricted cooperation introduced by Faigle (1989). In this model, the charac-
teristic function of the game is de…ned only on a system of coalitions, called
feasible coalitions. Other references on games with restricted cooperation are
Bilbao (2000) and Algaba et al. (2001).
The outline of this paper is as follows. After some preliminaries and nota-
tions in Section 2, in Section 3 we show that the monotonic core of an arbitrary
game is the core of a game with restricted cooperation which is introduced
from the initial game. In Section 4 we prove that the monotonic core of a
game having a PMAS always coincides with the core of another game related
to the previous game but now without restricted cooperation.
2 Preliminaries and notations
A cooperative game with transferable utility (a game) is a pair (N; v), where
N = f1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ng is a …nite set of players and v : 2N ! R is the characteristic
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function with v(?) = 0: A subset S of N , S 2 2N , is a coalition of players,
s = jSj its cardinality and v(S) is interpreted as the worth of the coalition
S. We denote by P (N) := fS µ N j S 6= ?g the set of nonempty coalitions
of N . Given S 2 P (N); we denote by (S; vS) the subgame of (N; v) related to
coalition S, i.e. vS (R) = v (R) for all R µ S: The class of games with player
set N is denoted by GN . We identify each game of GN with its characteristic
function.
As usual, a game v 2 GN is superadditive if v(S)+ v(T ) · v(S [T ) for all
S; T µ N with S \ T = ?.
A payo¤ vector is z = (zi)i2N 2 RN , where zi represents the payo¤ to
player i, and for S 2 P (N) we write z(S) := P
i2S
zi and z(?) := 0.
The core of a game v is the set
C (v) :=
©
z 2 RN j z (N) = v (N) and z (S) ¸ v (S) for all S 2 P (N)ª .
Thus the core C(v) is a convex and compact (possibly empty) polyhedral
subset of RN .
A game (N; v) is said to be balanced if it has a nonempty core, and totally
balanced if the subgame (S; vS) is balanced for all S 2 P (N) :
A Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme (or PMAS) of a game v (Spru-
mont, 1990) is a vector x =
¡
xSi
¢
S2P (N); i2S , with components x
S
i 2 R, that
satis…es the following conditions:X
i2S
xSi = v(S) for all S 2 P (N) : (1)
xRi · xSi for all R;S 2 P (N); R µ S, and all i 2 R: (2)
The …rst condition tells us that, for each coalition S 2 P (N); the payo¤ vector
xS :=
¡
xSi
¢
i2S 2 RS is a distribution of the amount v(S) among the players
of S. The second condition guarantees that each one of the players of S does
not receive more in any subcoalition R in which he takes part. Thus if x is a
PMAS of a game v, then x is an element of the vector space
Y
S2P (N)
RS; which
has dimension 2n¡1 ¢ n: Moreover, from conditions (1) and (2), it follows that
each payo¤ vector xS belongs to C(vS) for all PMAS x. Therefore, if a game
v has a PMAS, then it is totally balanced.
Moulin (1990) de…nes the monotonic core of the game v as the set of all
its PMAS. We denote this set by MC(v):
MC(v) :=
8<:x 2 Y
S2P (N)
RS
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ x is a PMAS of v
9=; .
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Thus the monotonic core MC(v) is a compact and convex (possibly empty)
subset of
Y
S2P (N)
RS. Therefore, the monotonic core has topological and alge-
braic properties similar to those of a core, and it seems reasonable to hope
that it may coincide with the core of another game with 2n¡1 ¢ n players.
In Section 4 we will show that MC(v) is the core of a game with 2n¡1 ¢ n
players. In order to de…ne such a game, the following concepts, from Faigle
(1989) and Algaba et al. (2001), are needed.
A game with restricted cooperation (Faigle, 1989) is a 4-tuple ¡ = (N; F ; w; w0)
satisfying the following conditions:
1. N is a …nite set.
2. F µ 2N is a selection of coalitions of N, called feasible coalitions, such
that ? 2 F :
3. w : F ¡! R is a function with w(?) = 0.
4. w0 2 R is the value of game ¡:
Faigle (1989) also de…ned the core of game ¡ by
C (¡) :=
©
x 2 RN j x (N) = w0 and x (T) ¸ w (T) for all T 2 Fª :
Thus the core C(¡) is a convex and closed (possibly empty) subset of RN; but,
in general, it is not bounded. However, if each individual coalition is a feasible
coalition (i.e. fig 2 F for all i 2 N); then this core is bounded and therefore
compact. Moreover, note that if N 2 F and w0 < w (N) then C(¡) = ?: For
more details on this see Derks and Reijnierse (1998).
Assuming that fig 2 F for all i 2 N; we can associate a game de…ned
on all the coalitions to any game with restricted cooperation ¡; since each
coalition S µ N can be partitioned in feasible coalitions, at least considering
its one-player subcoalitions. It is standard to de…ne the game (N; wF) by
wF (S) := max
P2PF (S)
ÃX
T2P
w (T)
!
(3)
for all nonempty coalition S µ N, where PF (S) denotes the set of all parti-
tions of S in feasible coalitions of N, and wF (?) := 0.
It follows from the previous de…nition that the game wF 2 GN is superad-
ditive and its restriction to F is greater than or equal to w: wF(T) ¸ w(T)
for all T 2 F . Moreover, wF is the smallest game of GN with these properties;
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i.e. if v 2 GN is a superadditive game such that v(T) ¸ w(T) for all T 2 F ,
then v(S) ¸ wF(S) for all S µ N. We also have wF(i) = w(i) for all i 2 N,
and wF(S) ¸ P
i2S
w(i) for all S µ N.
Note that the game (N; wF) does not depend on the value w0 of the game
¡; so the cores C (¡) and C
¡
wF
¢
are not equal in general. However these cores
coincide if both are in the hyperplane of e¢ciency establishes the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.1 (Faigle, 1989) If w0 = wF (N) ; then C (¡) = C
¡
wF
¢
:
3 Restricted cooperation and PMAS
Let (N; v) be a game. We begin this section building from (N; v) a game with
restricted cooperation b¡ = ³ bN; bF ; bv; bv0´ in such a way that its core, C ³b¡´ ;
coincides with the monotonic core MC(v).
We index the components xSi of every PMAS x of the game v by elements
of the set bN := f(S; i) j S 2 P (N); i 2 Sg ;
so the vectorial space R bN = Y
S2P (N)
RS and the set bN has bn := 2n¡1 ¢n players.
Note that each coalition S µ N can be identi…ed with the coalition [S] of bN
de…ned by:
[S] := f(S; i) j i 2 Sg ½ bN ([?] := ?) .
via the one-to-one mapping
2N ¡! 2 bN
S 7¡! [S] .
Now we can identify the feasible coalitions of bN . Given R; S 2 P (N) with
R µ S, and given i 2 R , we de…ne the following coalition of bN :
[S; R; i] := f(S; i)g [ f(R; j) j j 2 R n figg ½ bN:
In other words, coalition [S;R; i] is de…ned from [R] replacing player (R; i)
by player (S; i) of [S]. Observe that if R = fig, then the coalition [S; R; i]
is reduced to the single player (S; i); i.e. we have [S; fig ; i] = f(S; i)g for all
S 2 P (N); i 2 S. Moreover, if R = S; then [S; R; i] is the coalition [S]; i.e.
we have [S; S; i] = [S] for all S 2 P (N); i 2 S.
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The set of feasible coalitions of bN is de…ned by:bF := f[S; R; i] j R; S 2 P (N) with R µ S; i 2 Rg [ f?g ½ 2 bN :
By the above observation, notice that the individual coalitions of bN are always
feasible coalitions and that [S] 2 bF for all S 2 P (N). However, the coalitionbN is not a feasible coalition (i.e. bN =2 bF). An example of the partition of bN
in feasible coalitions is the set f[S] j S 2 P (N)g. Moreover, there are¯¯¯ bF ¯¯¯ = X
S2P (N)
0@ X
R2P (N); R½S
jRj + 1
1A + 1 = nX
s=1
µ
n
s
¶
¢
Ã
s¡1X
r=1
µ
s
r
¶
¢ r + 1
!
+ 1
=
nX
s=1
µ
n
s
¶
¢ ¡2s¡1 ¢ s ¡ s + 1¢ + 1 = 3n¡1 ¢ n ¡ 2n¡1 ¢ (n ¡ 2)
feasible coalitions, where the term 3n¡1 ¢ n is obtained by di¤erentiating the
equality 1 +
nX
s=1
µ
n
s
¶
ts = (t + 1)n with respect to t and replacing t by 2:
Next, we illustrate the preceding construction of the pair
³ bN; bF´ from N
with an example. Let N = f1; 2; 3g : Then bN = [
S2P (N)
[S] has b3 = 12 players
and there are
¯¯¯ bF ¯¯¯ = 23 feasible coalitions. The nonempty feasible coalitions
are the following:
(A) f(S; i)g for (S; i) 2 bN (12 coalitions),
(B) [S] for S 2 P (N) with s ¸ 2 (4 coalitions),
(C) [N; fi; jg ; i] = f(N; i) ; (fi; jg ; j)g for i 2 N and j 2 N nfig (6 coalitions).
Once the set of feasible coalitions is de…ned, in order to complete the game
with restricted cooperation
³ bN; bF ; bv; bv0´, we now de…ne, from our original
game v; the mapping bv : bF ¡! R bybv ([S; R; i]) := v (R) for [S; R; i] 2 bF ; and bv (?) := 0:
Notice that by de…nition we have bv (f(S; i)g) = v (i) for all (S; i) 2 bN , and
that bv ([S]) = v (S) for all S 2 P (N):
Finally, we take as value bv0 := X
S2P (N)
v (S) :
Summarizing, the extended game b¡ = ³ bN; bF ; bv; bv0´ associated to a coope-
rative game (N; v) is the game with restricted cooperation de…ned as
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1. bN = f(S; i) j i 2 Sg :
2. bF = f[S;R; i] j R;S 2 P (N) with R µ S; i 2 Rg [ f?g ;
where each [S; R; i] = f(S; i)g [ f(R; j) j j 2 R n figg :
3. bv ([S; R; i]) = v (R) for all [S; R; i] 2 bF and bv (?) = 0:
4. bv0 = X
S2P (N)
v (S).
In the next theorem we will show that the monotonic core of a cooperative
game (N; v) can always be viewed as the core of its extended cooperative game
with restricted cooperation b¡:
Theorem 3.1 Let (N; v) be a game. Then we have
MC(v) = C
³b¡´ ;
where b¡ = ³ bN; bF ; bv; bv0´ :
Proof: First we show the inclusion MC(v) µ C
³b¡´ : Let x 2 MC(v), we
will prove that x 2 C
³b¡´. To begin with, we prove e¢ciency (i.e. x³ bN´ =bv0). From condition (1), we obtain
x
³ bN´ = X
(S;i)2 bN
xSi =
X
S2P (N)
ÃX
i2S
xSi
!
=
X
S2P (N)
v (S) = bv0:
We prove now the coalitional rationality for the feasible coalitions; i.e. x (T) ¸bv (T) for all T 2 bF . Since x is a PMAS of v, from conditions (2) and (1) and
the de…nition of bv we deduce
x(T) = xSi +
X
j2Rnfig
xRj ¸
X
j2R
xRj = v (R) = bv (T) for all T = [S;R; i] 2 bF :
Now we show the other inclusion, C
³b¡´ µ MC(v): Let x 2 C ³b¡´ ; in
order to prove that x is a PMAS of (N; v), we …rst prove that x satis…es
condition (1). As a consequence of the coalitional rationality for the feasible
coalitions, we obtainX
i2S
xSi = x ([S]) ¸ bv ([S]) = v (S) for all S 2 P (N):
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Furthemore, from the e¢ciency of x, we have
X
S2P (N)
ÃX
i2S
xSi
!
= x
³ bN´ = bv0 = X
S2P (N)
v (S) :
Hence, x satis…es condition (1). We prove now that x also satis…es condition
(2). Let R; S 2 P (N) with R µ S and let i 2 R. As a consequence of condition
(1) and the coalitional rationality for the feasible coalitions, we obtain
xRi +
X
j2Rnfig
xRj = v (R) = bv ([S; R; i]) · x ([S; R; i]) = xSi + X
j2Rnfig
xRj ,
which implies xRi · xSi . So x satis…es condition (2). This …nishes the proof of
the theorem. ¥
4 The monotonic core as a core of a T.U.-
game
Let (N; v) be a game. Let b¡ = ³ bN; bF ; bv; bv0´ be the extended game with re-
stricted cooperation associated to (N; v) in Section 3. As we have noted above,
all individual coalitions f(S; i)g = [S; fig ; i] are feasible coalitions. Therefore,
we can de…ne the cooperative game
³ bN; bv bF´ associated to b¡ following de…n-
ition (3). Thus, for every non empty coalition S µ bN we have, by de…nition,
that
bv bF (S) = max
P2P bF (S)
0@ X
[S;R;i]2P
v(R)
1A (4)
where P bF (S) denotes the set of all partitions of S in feasible coalitions of bN .
In this section we see that the monotonic core MC (v) coincides with the
core C
³bv bF´ when our game v has a PMAS.
We know, from Section 2, that bv bF is the smallest superadditive game of
G bN whose restriction to bF is greater than or equal to bv. In fact, in the case
that v is totally essential (i.e.
P
i2S
v(i) · v(S) for all coalition S 2 P (N)) we
have that bv bF([S; R; i]) = v(R) for all feasible coalitions [S; R; i]. In particular,
in this case we have bv bF ([S]) = v(S) for all S µ N .
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One particular partition of bN in feasible coalitions, bN = [
S2P (N)
[S] ; shows
that bv bF ³ bN´ ¸ bv0 = X
S2P (N)
v (S) =
X
S2P (N)
ÃX
i2S
xSi
!
= x
³ bN´ ; (5)
for all PMAS x of our game v (if there are any). Unfortunately, the equalitybv bF ³ bN´ = bv0 is not true in general, not even in the case that v is totally
balanced as the following example shows.
Example 4.1 Let v be the glove market game with four players, N = f1; 2; 3; 4g ;
partitioned in two coalitions L = f1; 2g and R = f3; 4g. Each player of L
(resp. R) possesses a left (resp. right) hand glove. A left-right pair of gloves
can be sold at a market price of 1 monetary unit while a single glove has no
value. Thus v(S) = min fjS \ Lj ; jS \ Rjg for all S µ N . For this game we
have the inequality bv bF ³ bN´ > bv0:
Indeed, if in the partition bN = [
S2P (N)
[S] we replace the union of the coalitions
[f1; 3g] ; [f2; 3g] ; [f2; 4g] ; [f1; 2; 3g] and [f2; 3; 4g]
by the union of the feasible coalitions
[f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; 1] ; [f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; 3] ; [f1; 2; 3g ; f2; 3g ; 2] ;
[f2; 3; 4g ; f2; 3g ; 3] ; [f2; 3; 4g ; f2; 4g ; 2] and [f2; 3; 4g ; f2; 4g ; 4] ;
then we obtain a new partition of bN in feasible coalitions that shows the above
inequality, since
2 (v (13) + v (23) + v (24)) = 6 > 5 = v (13)+v (23)+v (24)+v (123)+v (234) :
Moreover, this game is totally balanced but it has no PMAS (cf. Sprumont,
1990).
Theorem 4.2 Let (N; v) be a game having a PMAS. Then we have
MC(v) = C
³bv bF´ ,
where
³ bN; bv bF´ is the game de…ned by (4).
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Proof: By Theorem 3.1 we have that the monotonic core MC(v) = C
³b¡´ ;
and by Lemma 2.1 we know that this last core is C
³b¡´ = C ³bv bF´ when bv0 =bv bF ³ bN´ : Therefore to prove the theorem it is su¢cient to see the inequality
bv bF ³ bN´ · bv0 (6)
since bv bF ³ bN´ ¸ bv0 holds by (5).
Let fTjgj2J be an arbitrary partition of bN in feasible coalitions. Thus each
Tj = [Sj ; Rj; ij ] with ij 2 Rj µ Sj µ N; and by de…nition bv (Tj) = v (Rj) :
Taking into account (4), we must prove the inequalityP
j2J
v (Rj) · bv0 (7)
to see (6). We observed above that, given i 2 S µ N; we have (S; i) 2 [S] µ
N^ =
[
j2J
Tj : Thus, there is a unique j 2 J such that (S; i) 2 Tj: Hence one of
the following cases occurs
(S; i) = (Sj; ij) or (S; i) = (Rj; k) with k 2 Rjn fijg :
Or, in other words,
S = Sj ¶ Rj and i = ij 2 Rj ; or S = Rj and i 6= ij:
Therefore, in both cases we have i 2 Rj µ S:
Let x 2 MC(v): Now note that every part of (7) can be written as followsX
j2J
v (Rj) =
X
j2J
0@X
i2Rj
xRji
1A = X
i2N
0@ X
j2J :Rj3i
xRji
1A ;
bv0 = X
S2P (N)
v(S) =
X
S2P (N)
ÃX
i2S
xSi
!
=
X
i2N
0@ X
S2P (N):S3i
xSi
1A ;
since N =
[
S2P (N)
S =
[
j2J
Rj as observed before. In consequence, it is su¢cient
to prove the inequalitiesX
j2J :Rj3i
xRji ·
X
S2P (N):S3i
xSi for i 2 N;
to show the inequality (7). But the above inequalities are directly obtained
from (2) and the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.3 With the above notations, let i 2 N: Then there exists a bijective
function
f : fS 2 P (N) j i 2 Sg ¡! fj 2 J j i 2 Rjg ;
that satis…es the following property:
Rf(S) µ S for all S 2 P (N) with i 2 S:
Proof: First we de…ne the function f: Let S 2 P (N) with i 2 S: We know
that there is a unique j 2 J such (S; i) 2 Tj = [Sj ; Rj ; ij ] with ij 2 Rj µ Sj µ
N; and we know that i 2 Rj µ S: We de…ne f(S) := j: Then the function f
is well de…ned and it satis…es the required property.
In order to show that f is a bijective function, we de…ne a mapping
g : fj 2 J j Rj 3 ig ¡! fS 2 P (N) j i 2 Sg
such that the compositions f ±g and g±f are the respective identity functions.
Let j 2 J with i 2 Rj : We de…ne
g (j) :=
½
Sj
Rj
if ij = i;
if ij 6= i:
It can be checked directly that the above compositions are the respective
identity functions. ¥
Now we can prove that the monotonic core of a game can always be iden-
ti…ed as the core of a complete game de…ned on bN: To do this we only have
to change the e¢ciency worth of the game
³ bN; bv bF´ by bv0 = X
S2P (N)
v (S) :
Corollary 4.4 Let (N; v) be a game. Then we have
MC (v) = C (v) ;
where
³ bN; v´ is de…ned by
v (S) := bv bF (S) for S ½ bN; (8)
v
³ bN´ := bv0:
Proof: Observe …rst that C (v) µ C
³b¡´ ; since we know that
v (T) = bv bF (T) ¸ bv (T) for all T 2 bF :
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If the game v does not have a PMAS then, by Theorem 3.1, C
³b¡´ = ?
and, by what we have just observed, C (v) = ?:
On the other hand, if the game v has a PMAS, then bv bF ³ bN´ = bv0 (i.e.bv bF = v ) as we have seen in the proof of Theorem 4.2, and the corollary is
obtained using this same theorem. ¥
From the above corollary we now deduce the following characterization of
the games having a PMAS. It is rather theoretical in nature.
Corollary 4.5 Let (N; v) be a game and let
³ bN; v´ be the game de…ned in
(8). Then v has a PMAS if and only if
³ bN; v´ is balanced. ¥
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